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Celia Kitzinger is Professor of Gender, Sexuality 
and Conversation Analysis in the Department of Sociol-
ogy, University of York, UK.1 She participated as a guest 
speaker at the 7th Conference of the International Gender 
and Language Association (IGALA 7) held for the fi rst 
time in South America, at the Universidade do Vale 
do Rio dos Sinos (Unisinos), Brazil, from June 20-22, 
2012. Celia Kitzinger also conducted a pre-conference 
workshop entitled “Conversation Analysis and Gender: 
An Introduction”. 
Ana Cristina Ostermann: What is Feminist Con-
versation Analysis and how it is distinguished from the 
more canonical studies in Conversation Analysis (CA)?
Celia Kitzinger: Some feminist researchers use 
the methods and discoveries of ‘canonical’ conversa-
tion analysis to address issues of feminist concern – and 
that’s what I mean by ‘feminist conversation analysis.’ 
Ever since my PhD research on the social construction of 
lesbian identities (Kitzinger, 1987) my research has been 
focused on feminist issues. I was doing feminist research 
for more than a decade before I discovered conversation 
analysis. My background is in Social Psychology, not 
Linguistics, and I used a range of different social science 
methods. Mostly I relied on interviews and thematic or 
discourse analysis of them, but I also used Q methodol-
ogy, story-completion and textual analysis of written 
outputs. Then, in 1999-2000, I spent a sabbatical year in 
the Sociology Department at University of California, 
Los Angeles (UCLA) where I took courses with leading 
conversation analysts (Professors Emanuel Schegloff, 
John Heritage and Steve Clayman) and since then I have 
collected naturally-occurring data and used conversation 
analysis in much (though not all) of my feminist work. 
I’ve used conversation analysis to research gender and 
interruption (Kitzinger, 2008a), ‘coming out’ as lesbian 
(Kitzinger, 2000), heteronormativity in doctors’ interac-
tions with carers (Kitzinger, 2005), and counselling for 
women traumatised after childbirth (Kitzinger, 2011). 
I’ve also worked with feminist doctoral students using 
conversation analysis to research a wide range of feminist 
topics, including women’s emotional labour in beauty 
salons (Toerien and Kitzinger, 2007), lesbian and gay 
awareness training (Kitzinger and Peel, 2005) and police 
responses to violence against women in (Brazilian) police 
stations (Guimarães, 2007). This ‘feminist conversation 
analysis’ is distinguished from more canonical studies 
in that it harnesses the powerful tools of conversation 
analytic methodology for specifi cally feminist purposes. 
Let me give you an example of ‘feminist conversa-
tion analysis’. I’ve recently published a piece of research 
with Rebecca Shaw (Shaw and Kitzinger, 2012), based 
on her doctoral research analysing a set of calls to a 
telephone helpline for women trying to arrange a home 
birth. Although women in the UK have the legal right to 
give birth at home with a midwife in attendance, home 
birth is unusual (only around 2% of births) and often 
very diffi cult to organise. Most callers to the home birth 
helpline are seeking help because obstacles to home birth 
have been put in their way – unsupportive doctors or mid-
wives, alleged medical counter-indications, claimed staff 
shortages and so on. The advertised aim of the helpline 
is to “empower women around home birth”, i.e. to com-
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municate to callers their own right to give birth in a place 
of their choosing, and to support them in achieving that. 
One important way the call-taker accomplishes (what the 
helpline intends by) “empowerment” is by complimenting 
women, e.g. “You’re terrifi c!”, “I admire what you’re do-
ing”, “I think you’re doing brilliantly and I can’t see but 
that you will succeed”, “I love your attitude!”. Of course 
there is already a huge literature on compliments. Our 
study is a distinctively CA contribution in part because it 
uses naturally-occurring data (not experiments, discourse 
completion tasks, questionnaires or role play) and in part 
because we analyse it by drawing on, and developing, 
existing CA discoveries (turn-taking, sequence organisa-
tion, repair, word selection and so on). Our research builds 
on and develops the canonical CA work on compliments 
by Anita Pomerantz (1978) by demonstrating something 
of the range and diversity of compliment design and by 
showing how compliments and compliment responses 
are adapted to this particular institutional context. But 
unlike most conversation analysis, our research has an 
avowedly feminist aim: we want to use our fi ndings to 
help counsellors (and others) to achieve their aim of 
empowering women. That aim was part of what initially 
informed our selection of the data set, and it contributed 
to our selection of research foci in analysing the data set. 
Our research shows that (and how) complimenting – in a 
particular way – works to empower women, in the sense 
that women accept or agree with the positive assessment 
of their skills, abilities, personalities etc, and come to 
share the call-taker’s view that they can overcome the 
obstacles to giving birth at home. As feminists we are also 
committed to ensuring that our fi ndings reach the people 
who might benefi t from them, and I regularly contribute 
to training days for counsellors, midwives, antenatal 
teachers, doulas, and others who work to support women 
in childbirth. So as feminists we’ve found conversation 
analysis enormously helpful in understanding how ‘em-
powerment’ – or, at least, one element of it – is actually 
done in practice, and have used our ‘feminist conversation 
analysis’ to work with practitioners who are able to use 
our fi ndings to make their own professional practice more 
effective in empowering women. 
Going back to the question, there’s a sense then in 
which feminist conversation analysis is canonical conver-
sation analysis – it’s an application of the conversation 
analytic canon to feminist concerns. As such it’s often 
not so different from other applied conversation analytic 
work which applies canonical conversation analysis to 
(for example) addressing the problems of antibiotic 
over-prescribing, or unmet concerns in doctor-patient 
interaction. Just as we assume – on the basis of our femi-
nist beliefs – that empowering women is ethically and 
politically desirable, so too other conversation analysts 
have taken for granted (on their basis of their ethical 
positions) that reducing antibiotic prescribing, or ensuring 
that patients get to raise additional concerns in medical 
consultations, is a desirable outcome to which conversa-
tion analytic fi ndings can contribute. And like them we 
have applied canonical CA methods and discoveries to 
recorded naturally-occurring human interaction to fi gure 
out what elements of human interaction already work 
towards the achievement of that goal with the aim of 
encouraging their greater use.
Finally I’d add that some of my feminist research 
is not conversation analysis at all – I continue to use other 
approaches where these are better fi tted to the research 
question I want to address. And equally some of my 
conversation analytic research is not feminist at all but is 
generated simply by intellectual curiosity about (for ex-
ample) how people can understand who is being referred to 
when the initial reference to a person is an indexical (“he” 
or “she”) and why speakers would risk misunderstanding 
by speaking in that way (Kitzinger; et al., 2012); or what 
people are doing when they repair a “we” to and “I” or 
vice versa (Lerner and Kitzinger, 2007). I often launch 
my ‘non-feminist’ conversation analytic work when I run 
into the limits of the conversation analytic canon – there is 
still an enormous amount we do not know about the basic 
organisation of talk-in-interaction. 
ACO: In which ways does feminist conversation 
analysis help scholars interested in studying gender and 
sexuality in interaction that other approaches do not?
CK: Clearly if you’re studying interaction, conver-
sation analysis is the method par excellence – described as 
“the dominant approach to the study of human social inter-
action across the disciplines of Sociology, Linguistics and 
Communication” (Stivers and Sidnell, in press). Unlike 
many other approaches in applied linguistics, its key dis-
coveries are derived from the study of interactional data. 
Conversation analysis was founded by lawyer-turned-
sociologist Harvey Sacks (1992) when the invention of 
the (audio) tape-recorder meant that he was able to capture 
and repeatedly inspect recorded conversations. He listened 
to these conversations with an interest (derived from the 
then newly-born theory of ethnomethodology) in how 
people make sense of the world as displayed through their 
actions. Sacks’ interest was not in talk as language, but in 
talk as action, meaning how it is designed and employed 
to do things like complimenting, inviting, apologising, dis-
agreeing, telling news or giving advice, plus a great many 
other actions we don’t have ordinary vernacular names 
for. His fi rst data set was recordings of calls to a suicide 
prevention centre. Recordings of those interactions, along 
with subsequent recordings from a group therapy session 
for adolescents and a set of ordinary phone conversations 
between households in California, formed the empirical 
basis for the basic discoveries of CA, and these constitute 
the ‘toolkit’ that I bring, as a conversation analyst, to my 
own analysis of data. This ‘toolkit’ is perfectly fi tted to the 
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analysis of interaction because – unlike other approaches 
which start from a theory about interaction (e.g. ‘perfor-
mativity’) – the CA approach has from the outset started 
with data and its key discoveries (turn taking, sequence 
organisation etc.) are basically descriptions of the methods 
people use for designing their talk-in-interaction, rather 
than theoretically-derived constructs.
Conversation analysis provides us with a toolkit we 
can use to analyse how gender and sexuality are produced 
in interaction and what they are used to accomplish. For 
me one of the most interesting and distinctive features of 
the kind of work conversation analysts are doing in relation 
to gender and sexuality is to expose the extent to which 
they are deployed in the service of other actions. Explicit 
talk about gender and sexuality is relatively infrequent 
in most people’s ordinary daily conversations (which is 
of course why non-CA researchers sometimes resort to 
interviews and focus groups to elicit this material). But 
gender and sexuality are relied upon, referred to in passing, 
indexed, presumed and used as the basis for a great many 
everyday actions apparently unrelated to gender and sexu-
ality per se. My main interest is in using CA to understand 
what these ‘incidental’ uses of gender and sexuality are 
used to do, how they work, and their repeated use serves 
to reproduce, reinforce, normalise (and sometimes resist) 
conventional taken-for-granted social beliefs. 
Let me illustrate what I mean with an example 
from Harvey Sacks (1992). In one of the group therapy 
sessions, it becomes clear that Louise, the only female 
member of the group has had to drop out because of her 
work commitments. The therapist asks Ken, one of the 
other group members, “Do you miss her?” and he replies 
“Well in some ways yes. It was nice having the opposite 
sex in the room, you know, having a chick”2. Sacks sug-
gests that what Ken is doing is a ‘safe compliment’: it 
is a compliment to Louise because he indicates that he 
would like her to be present in the group, and it is ‘safe’ 
because the reason he gives for wanting her there is her 
gender (indexed both by ‘opposite sex’ and by ‘chick’) 
which distinguishes her from all the others in the group. 
Sacks speculates that gender is selected here not because 
Ken is specifi cally ‘doing gender’ or ‘doing heterosexual-
ity’ but because gender is a way of singling out Louise 
as someone he likes to have in the group without run-
ning the risk of insulting the others as might have been 
found to be the case had he said that he wanted Louise 
there because she was ‘clever’ or ‘honest’ or ‘has a good 
sense of humour’. These alternative possibilities, Sacks 
suggests, sets up the possibility that one of the other (all-
male) participants could say ‘Well what about me – I’m 
pretty clever aren’t I’, or ‘Don’t I have a good sense of 
humour?’ – in other words they could take it that the com-
pliment to Louise is, by virtue of the item picked, thereby 
an insult to them. And this observation led Sacks into a 
whole speculation about how non-addressed participants 
in multi-party interaction engage with (and sometimes 
respond to) the actions of a speaker. From the point of 
view of those of us interested in gender and sexuality in 
interaction, gender is being deployed here as a vehicle 
for an action which is really quite unrelated to gender 
as such – and it is deployable in this way because it is 
readily available in our social world as a way of divid-
ing people into two (and, in these speakers’ world, only 
two) categories and because it is readily understood (by 
these apparently heterosexual young men) that having 
‘the opposite sex’ in the room is a ‘nice’ and desirable 
thing. What the speaker is oriented to achieving in his 
utterance may be a ‘safe compliment’ but in doing so 
he relies on, and reinforces, both dichotomous gender 
categories and normative heterosexuality. This is, from 
the point of view of feminist conversation analysis (but 
probably not for Sacks!) a concrete example of the way 
in which gendered heteronormativity gets reproduced in 
ordinary mundane talk in interaction.
Here’s another example, drawn from a data set of 
phone calls from lesbian households, collected by Victoria 
Land for her doctoral research3. A caller to the national 
health service helpline requests an emergency dental ap-
pointment “not for me but for my partner whose tooth’s 
come out”. She sounds clearly female and the adviser asks 
“is he in pain”, selecting the masculine pronoun (“he”) to 
refer to “my partner”. Clearly the adviser is not “doing het-
erosexuality” or aiming to perpetuate heteronormativity. 
The action she’s engaged in is trying to assess the extent to 
which the call should be treated as requiring ‘emergency’ 
action and the choice of pronoun is merely incidental to 
the design of the turn. It is, nonetheless, an example of 
what gender and sexuality researchers mean by the term 
‘heteronormativity’. When the caller responds with “She’s 
lost the front tooth and in quite considerable pain”, the 
explicit action of her turn is ‘doing answering’ and using 
the opportunity to reinforce the severity of the problem 
(it’s a ‘front tooth’ and the pain is ‘quite considerable’) 
and the consequent need for emergency dental treatment. 
Nonetheless, this is also an instance of what lesbian femi-
nist researchers have identifi ed as ‘coming out’ – which 
is only sometimes done with explicit announcements 
(heralded by the classic and stereotypical “Mother, I have 
something to tell you”). My own experience as a lesbian 
is that I most often come out in exactly the same way that 
2 This is a slightly simplifi ed version of the data. For Sacks’ transcript and analysis of it, see Sacks (1992), Lectures on Conversation, Part II, Lecture 
2, ‘Safe Compliments’, p. 98-99).
3 The data extract has been simplifi ed for ease of presentation here. For a full transcript and analysis see Land and Kitzinger (2005).
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this caller does – by getting on with the business in hand 
while correcting (often, as here, with an ‘embedded’ cor-
rection that never rises to the surface of the talk) the gen-
der attributed to my partner. These moments capture the 
routine, totally unremarkable (and usually not remarked 
upon), mundane reproduction of gender and sexuality in 
everyday life. Other methods of researching ‘coming out’ 
as a linguistic act – such as asking people to describe how 
they do it – yield descriptions of how this sort of thing 
is done. Conversation analysis (of the appropriate data) 
yields actual instances of how it is done, and for me that’s 
much more exciting! 
ACO: How does feminist conversation analysis 
fi t within the larger discussion of macro-level vs. micro-
level approaches to the understanding of language and 
gender issues?
CK: The early development of conversation 
analysis was infl uenced by ethnomethodology – which 
is often described as a ‘micro-level’ and ‘bottom-up’ ap-
proach to understanding the social world and contrasted 
with ‘macro-level’ approaches which focus on the ‘top 
down’ power exerted over people’s lives by law, social 
policy, government decisions, and institutional constraints. 
It seems clear to me both that people are active agents 
who construct the social world through their moment-by-
moment interactions and equally – to use the oft-quoted 
paraphrase of Marx – that they do not do so under condi-
tions of their own making. Conversation analysis focuses 
on the moment-by-moment construction of the social 
world through interaction. Other broader-brush methods 
focus on the social, political, and legal (‘macro’) context 
within which these (‘micro’) interactions take place. As a 
feminist who wants to understand the world in order to 
change it, I believe that it is important to understand both. 
It is often argued that the ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ 
cannot be distinctly separated – for example that law and 
social policy are hammered out through people engaged in 
talk-in-interaction in committees, boardrooms, courtrooms 
and parliamentary debates. This is true, of course, but it 
seems to me that for feminists who want to make macro-
level interventions, CA is not necessarily the method of 
choice (and neither is academic linguistics more gener-
ally). It’s not that you can’t research law and social policy 
using CA – it’s just that I’m sceptical about what this kind 
of research can achieve politically. Of course I would love 
to be proved wrong! 
Take same-sex marriage as an example. I have 
carried out CA analyses that explore some of the in-
teractional consequences of the exclusion of same-sex 
couples from the civil law defi nition of ‘marriage’ in 
the UK (Land and Kitzinger, 2007) and these analyses 
provide empirical support for Sally McConnell-Ginet’s 
(2006) claim that defi ning same-sex unions (even those 
which accord equivalent rights to marriage) as ‘civil 
unions’ or ‘civil partnerships’ is much more than ‘just 
semantics’. But I’m not convinced that either CA or 
sociolinguistics offer much we can use in actually 
challenging the ban on same-sex marriage. The ban 
is upheld and reinforced by right-wing and religious 
conservative forces that are unlikely to be infl uenced 
by our careful analyses of language and interaction. 
My own approach to macro-level social change has 
been to work with the UK human rights and civil 
liberties organisation, Liberty, to bring a High Court 
challenge to the UK’s refusal to recognise my valid 
Canadian (same-sex) marriage. With my wife, and 
colleague, Sue Wilkinson, I established a campaigning 
organisation (Equal Marriage Rights4) and worked with 
organisations like Equal Love5 and Out4Marriage6 to 
end the ban on same-sex marriage.7 Similarly, for the 
work I am currently doing to challenge current medico-
legal decision-making about people with disorders of 
consciousness after severe brain injury (i.e. people in 
comas, vegetative states or minimally conscious states), 
it does not seem pertinent to use conversation analysis.8
In my experience, it is not really necessary (or 
effective, or time-efficient) to analyse macro-level 
gross inequalities and overt discrimination – like the 
ban on same sex marriage or queer bashing, economic 
discrimination, hate-speech, rape, or femicide – using 
conversation analysis. There are other more direct and 
potentially effective ways for feminists to work on these 
issues. What conversation analysis is so good at, and so 
effective at uncovering, is the routine, mundane, taken-
for-granted (micro-level) ways in which an everyday 
world of gendered and sexual inequalities is produced and 
reproduced in ordinary interaction. The challenge then is 
to see whether they can be changed.
ACO: What do you see as the benefi ts of branch-
ing out conversation analysis into different subfi elds like 





7 See, for example, Kitzinger and Wilkinson (2004a; 2004b).
8 With my sister and colleague Jenny Kitzinger, I am carrying out interviews with family members of people with prolonged disorders of consciousness 
after brain injury and analyzing them using thematic analysis – see Kitzinger and Kitzinger [in press]. This research, too, is guided by feminist 
imperatives – the personal is still political. See http://www.thehastingscenter.org/Bioethicsforum/Post.aspx?id=5557&blogid=140; and our video at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kS1yZzrKSNg
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CK: I’m not sure there are really different ‘sub-
fi elds’. It think it’s more that with the massive growth 
of conversation analysis over the last decade, and with 
increasing numbers of scholars using CA across a wide 
range of languages, contexts, topics, and disciplinary 
boundaries, the fi eld of CA is becoming increasingly var-
ied. The larger a fi eld becomes, the more ways there are 
of ‘slicing’ it up, grouping some kinds together and sepa-
rating them from others. As the fi eld of CA has developed 
and diversifi ed some critics have tried to circumscribe 
and contain the fi eld, claiming either that CA can never 
accomplish particular kinds of analysis (e.g. of broader 
social context, see the extensive debate in Discourse 
and Society between Billig (1999), Schegloff (1997) 
and Wetherall (1998)) or that the use of CA to achieve 
particular political or pragmatic ends is somehow betray-
ing its fundamental principles (see the Human Studies 
debate between Kitzinger (2008b) and Wowk (2007)). 
Despite these debates, conversation analysis has contin-
ued to diversify, and many conversation analysts today 
do a range of different analytic work – some ‘basic’ CA 
research (i.e. uncovering the building blocks of human 
interaction); some engaging with political issues; some 
‘applied’ in the sense that it is designed with reference to 
its potential usefulness to users or interest groups. John 
Heritage (at University of California, Los Angeles), for 
example, has a long history of ‘basic’ CA researching 
core features of talk-in-interaction (like ‘oh’- and ‘and’-
prefacing, in Heritage (1984) and Heritage and Sorjonen 
(1994)), has developed conversation analytic approaches 
to political interviews (Clayman and Heritage, 2002), and 
has done clearly ‘applied’ work intended to have direct 
practical applications for practitioners (Heritage et al., 
2007) My own CA research likewise bridges all these 
elements and I don’t necessarily see myself as contribut-
ing to different ‘subfi elds’ but rather as exploring and 
contributing to the full range and diversity of conversa-
tion analysis as a fi eld. 
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